From the AP. I presume they weren't trying to be funny with the "driving factor" point: "Hundreds of U.S. Marines have been killed or injured by roadside bombs in Iraq because Marine Corps bureaucrats refused an urgent request in 2005 from battlefield commanders for blast-resistant vehicles, an internal military study concludes. The study, written by a civilian Marine Corps official and obtained by The Associated Press, accuses the service of 'gross mismanagement' that delayed deliveries of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected trucks for more than two years. Cost was a driving factor in the decision to turn down the request for the so-called MRAPs, according to the study. Stateside authorities saw the hulking vehicles, which can cost as much as a $1 million each, as a financial threat to programs aimed at developing lighter vehicles that were years from being fielded."
Saturday, February 16, 2008
'Gross mismanagement' killed these Marines
From the AP. I presume they weren't trying to be funny with the "driving factor" point: "Hundreds of U.S. Marines have been killed or injured by roadside bombs in Iraq because Marine Corps bureaucrats refused an urgent request in 2005 from battlefield commanders for blast-resistant vehicles, an internal military study concludes. The study, written by a civilian Marine Corps official and obtained by The Associated Press, accuses the service of 'gross mismanagement' that delayed deliveries of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected trucks for more than two years. Cost was a driving factor in the decision to turn down the request for the so-called MRAPs, according to the study. Stateside authorities saw the hulking vehicles, which can cost as much as a $1 million each, as a financial threat to programs aimed at developing lighter vehicles that were years from being fielded."
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2 comments:
1. Either the press reporting or the report itself is mistaken. The decision to proceed with an upgrade to existing trucks or to purchase new trucks is not a procurement activity decision, it is a program management decision. The analysis of alternatives is conducted by the progam office, not the procurement office. Any procurement action, especially one having life or death implications, could be expedited with high level DoD approvals. Sophisticated program management reviews exist to support such approvals. It appears that the entire acquisition process broke down, possibly from political interference in long-standing procedures. These procedures, had they not been circumvented, would have resulted in the rapid procurement of the new trucks if that truly was the appropriate option. Rather it appears that cost considerations by the administration were held paramount. This was not a procurement failure.
Don't be mislead or fooled by characterizations that make it seem as if this "study" or "report" represents anything more than the opinions of a single individual within Marine Corps Headquarters. It is a wholly internal study that hasn't made it past the desk of this gent's immediate supervisor, much less any senior leaders. One guy's perspective and opinion -- and he's certainly entitled to his opinions but they should be based in facts, which isn't the case here.
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